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EVOLVED STANDARDS, EVOLVING JUSTICES? 
THE CASE FOR A BROADER APPLICATION OF 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
WILLIAM W. BERRY III* 
ABSTRACT 
In its Eighth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has often cited 
counter-majoritarian considerations as the basis for exercising judicial 
restraint. As a result, excessive and draconian punishments persist in the 
United States, with the Court being hesitant to use the Constitution to bar 
state punishment practices. 
The Court’s evolving standards of decency doctrine, however, is 
majoritarian. As this Article argues, the doctrinal framework of the Court 
alleviates the counter-majoritarian difficulty, as the Court’s applications of 
the Eighth Amendment mirror majoritarian practices and only strike down 
outlier punishments.  
Given the lack of justification for judicial restraint under the Eighth 
Amendment, the Article maps a series of possible applications of the 
Constitution in this area, both on a micro-level—to limit punishments in 
certain circumstances—and on a macro-level—to bar certain punishments 
altogether. In particular, the Article reveals the current ability of the Court 
to apply its Eighth Amendment doctrine to abolish the death penalty and 
juvenile life-without-parole sentences. 
In short, the Article demonstrates that society’s standards with respect 
to criminal punishments have evolved. The question remains whether the 
justices themselves will evolve accordingly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If we do not step forward, then we step back. If we do not protect a right, 
then we deny it.   
       — Paul Martin 
 
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court held 5–4 that the death penalty, 
as applied, constituted a “cruel and unusual punishment” that violated the 
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Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 The public backlash 
was immediate, and the response from state legislatures was swift.2 Within 
a year, thirty-five states had passed new capital statutes, and in 1976, the 
Court held that several state capital statutes were constitutional.3 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has not held that the Eighth Amendment completely bars 
any punishment since Furman.4 
The core criticism of Furman, and a concern of several of the dissenting 
justices, centered around the legitimacy of the Court’s decision to strike 
down a state statute, as doing so arguably meant substituting the judgment 
of the Court for the will of the people.5 The majority believed, by contrast, 
that the state capital schemes violated the individual rights of criminal 
offenders (and the Constitution) by imposing the death penalty in an 
arbitrary and random manner.6 
                                                 
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
2. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2007); STUART 
BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 267 (2002) (asserting that Furman “touched 
off the biggest flurry of capital punishment legislation the nation had ever seen.”); Jonathan Simon, Why 
Do You Think They Call It CAPITAL Punishment? Reading the Killing State, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
783, 795 (2002) (“Few other decisions of the Supreme Court have ever received a more rapid legislative 
response.”); LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE 83, 85 
(1992); Death Penalty Has Been Restored by 13 States, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1973, at 18 (listing states 
that restored death penalty in 1973 legislative session); The Death Penalty Gets a Big Push, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP., Mar. 26, 1973, at 70; MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 284–91 (1973). 
3. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. 
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). But see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (striking 
down a mandatory capital punishment statute); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (same). 
4. Indeed, the only punishment barred is loss of citizenship. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
The Court has, of course, placed limits on when certain punishments may be imposed. See, e.g., Kennedy 
v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (barring capital sentences for all non-homicide crimes, including child 
rape); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (barring capital sentences for juvenile offenders); Atkins 
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (barring capital sentences for intellectually-disabled offenders); Coker 
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (barring capital sentences for the crime of rape). 
5. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]t is essential to our role as a court 
that we not seize upon the enigmatic character of the guarantee as an invitation to enact our personal 
predilections into law.”); id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“We should not allow our personal 
preferences as to the wisdom of legislative and congressional action, or our distaste for such action, to 
guide our judicial decision in cases such as these.”); id. at 418 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[This] is the 
very sort of judgment that the legislative branch is competent to make and for which the judiciary is ill-
equipped.”). See also Lain, supra note 2, at 51; Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The 
Death Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 18 (2002) (noting 
that Furman “fueled popular resentment of the federal government imposing its will on the states.”); 
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of 
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 406–10 (1995) (describing 
the popular and legislative backlash to the Court’s decision in Furman). 
6. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 304–05 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The asserted public belief that 
murderers and rapists deserve to die is flatly inconsistent with the execution of a random few.”); id. at 
309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful 
upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.”). 
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The counter-majoritarian difficulty—the legitimacy of five justices 
overruling state statutes—rests at the heart of much of the academic debate 
in constitutional law during the late twentieth century.7 While this tension 
between respecting majority will and protecting the individual 
constitutional rights of political minorities has not stopped the Court from 
striking down state and federal statutes in other contexts,8 the Court has 
demonstrated a reluctance to limit state punishment practices under the 
Eighth Amendment.9 Indeed, with respect to the imposition of substantive 
punishments, the Eighth Amendment largely remained a dead letter for over 
two decades in the 1980s and 1990s.10  
In the past decade, however, the Court has taken baby steps and started 
to impose some categorical limitations on state punishment practices under 
the Eighth Amendment. For instance, the Court has proscribed death 
sentences for intellectually disabled offenders,11 juvenile offenders,12 and 
child rape.13 More recently, the Court has prohibited juvenile life-without-
parole sentences in non-homicide cases14 and when imposed as a mandatory 
sentence.15 
During this era of Supreme Court passivity, a proliferation of cruel and 
unusual punishments has emerged in the United States. The United States 
remains one of the few Western nations that still use capital punishment,16 
                                                 
7. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Two: Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); 
Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 
Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000); Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 
(1998); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
8. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979); 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). JUSTIA has compiled 
a list of almost a thousand such cases. State Laws Held Unconstitutional, JUSTIA, https://law.justia.com/ 
constitution/us/state-laws-held-unconstitutional.html [http://perma.cc/M2DP-VM5E].  
9. See discussion infra Part II. 
10. After Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court only placed two limitations on 
punishments until it decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
782 (1982) (striking down a felony murder conviction where defendant did not kill or intend to kill); 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (reversing sentence of life-without-parole for presenting a no-
account check for $100, where defendant had six prior felony convictions). 
11. Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014); Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 304.  
12. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
13. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Coker, 433 U.S. at 584. 
14. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
15. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
16. See generally ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE 
PERSPECTIVE (5th ed. 2015) (providing a comprehensive survey of retentionist and abolitionist 
countries). 
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and its current usage is rife with error,17 racial disparity,18 arbitrary 
imposition,19 and innocent individuals sentenced to death.20 Similarly, 
American use of life-without-parole (LWOP) sentences dwarfs that of the 
rest of the world, with almost 50,000 offenders serving LWOP sentences.21 
Further, the United States is the only country in the world that allows the 
imposition of LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders.22 
These practices are part of a larger mass incarceration epidemic in 
America,23 with the United States responsible for a quarter of the world’s 
prison population despite only having five percent of the world’s total 
population.24 Indeed, over the past decade, the United States has housed the 
largest prison population in the history of the world.25 
This Article argues that the concerns of the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty with respect to deferring to the will of the people should have no 
bearing on the Court’s application of the Eighth Amendment to state 
punishment practices, at least under the Court’s current doctrine. In its 
application of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court uses the evolving 
                                                 
17. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals of 
Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209 (2004); James S. Liebman, 
Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000).  
18. See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).  
19. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–76 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(cataloging all of the many flaws with the modern death penalty in the United States, including 
arbitrariness). 
20. Since 1973, 161 death row inmates have been exonerated and released. Innocence and the 
Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty 
[http://perma.cc/A5LE-2JCY].  
21. See, e.g., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE SENTENCES 
IN AMERICA 1 (2013), https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Life-Goes-On.pdf [htt 
p://perma.cc/C5LV-S2ZM]; Hanna Kozlowska, One in Three Prisoners Serving a Life Term Anywhere 
is in the U.S., QUARTZ (May 3, 2017), https://qz.com/974658/life-prison-sentences-are-far-more-comm 
on-in-the-us-than-anywhere-else/ [https://perma.cc/K6TV-BWAY]. 
22. See, e.g., Saki Knafo, Here Are All the Countries Where Children Are Sentenced to Die in 
Prison, HUFFPOST (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/20/juvenile-life-without-
parole_n_3962983.html [https://perma.cc/QA86-H9N9]. 
23. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 
(1999); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY (2014); 13TH (Netflix 2016).  
24. See, e.g., Illegal Drugs: Economic Impact, Societal Costs, Policy Responses: Hearing Before 
the J. Econ. Comm., 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (statement of Sen. Jim Webb, Member, J. Econ. Comm.) 
(commenting on the nation’s prison population). Senator Webb added, “Either we have the most evil 
people in the world, or we are doing something wrong with the way that we handle our criminal justice 
system, and I choose to believe the latter.” Id. at 1–2. See also Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. 
Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison. 
html?src=tp (comparing the prison population in the United States with those of other countries).  
25. See Criminal Justice Facts, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
criminal-justice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/L5W3-EAK6].  
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standards of decency doctrine to demarcate the line between constitutional 
punishments and cruel and unusual punishments.26 What constitutes a cruel 
and unusual punishment is not static—the Supreme Court has made clear 
that the “evolving standards of decency” change over time, consistent with 
the maturing of society.27  
What has happened is that society’s standards have evolved, but the 
Court’s cases have not. The views of the justices, perhaps, are still evolving 
to catch up with the shift in societal standards. A number of cruel and 
unusual punishments persist, but the Court seems unwilling to restrict these 
legislative overreaches. 
The core of the Court’s evolving standards doctrine mandates assessing 
the majoritarian practices of states. It does not substitute the Court’s 
judgment for that of a particular state; it strikes down state punishment 
practices that are outliers as compared to the evolved standard—respecting 
the democratic norm of society. Further, the evolving-standards-of-decency 
doctrine ensures the protection of some individual rights by taking the step 
to strike down excessive state punishment practices. Finally, the Court’s 
approach promotes judicial legitimacy, in theory, by simultaneously 
respecting democratic norms and individual rights. 
After demonstrating why there is no counter-majoritarian tension related 
to the Court’s Eighth Amendment doctrine and thus no reason not to apply 
the doctrine, the Article offers a holistic approach to the application of the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment doctrine to current punishment practices in the 
United States. This assessment examines punishments on a micro (limiting 
a particular application) and a macro (complete prohibition) level. This 
includes explaining why current societal standards provide a basis both for 
the abolition of juvenile life-without-parole (JLWOP) sentences and the 
death penalty. 
In Part I, the Article argues that the evolving standards doctrine enables 
judicial intervention through its simultaneous advancement of a pro-
democratic analysis that supports the protection of individual rights. In Part 
II, the Article establishes that the Court’s use of the doctrine has historically 
                                                 
26. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (articulating the 
concept of evolving standards of decency); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (applying 
the doctrine to bar execution of intellectually disabled offenders). This approach has garnered serious 
criticism in that the Court has applied it largely only to death cases (and more recently, juvenile LWOP 
cases) creating essentially two tracks of criminal justice in the United States. Rachel E. Barkow, The 
Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009) (acknowledging the Court’s different treatment of capital cases).  
27. See, e.g., Trop, 356 U.S. at 99–101; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910). See 
also John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel 
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1815 (2008) (arguing that the original meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment is that its scope will evolve over time). 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2018] EVOLVED STANDARDS, EVOLVING JUSTICES? 111 
 
 
 
been a majoritarian exercise. Given the absence of counter-majoritarian 
restrictions, Parts III and IV provide a road map for the evolving justices to 
apply the evolved standards to restrict excessive punishments. Part III 
explores the application of the doctrine to punishments on a micro level, 
identifying possible categorical exceptions similar to the Court’s recent 
cases. Part IV of the Article examines the application of the evolving 
standards to punishments on a macro level, demonstrating the increasingly 
compelling basis for a determination that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
both juvenile LWOP and the death penalty. Finally, Part V concludes the 
Article by briefly assessing whether and when the justices might evolve and 
constitutionalize society’s evolved standards. 
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT JUDICIAL REVIEW 
In the application of constitutional provisions to state legislative 
enactments,28 a wide range of approaches is possible.29 On this spectrum of 
judicial review,30 a judge may adopt, at one extreme, a position completely 
deferential to state legislatures,31 refusing to apply the constitutional 
provision to the statute.32 On the other extreme, a judge could impose his or 
                                                 
28. Scholars have long debated the degree of deference courts should accord legislative 
interpretations of the Constitution. Compare, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The 
Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
302 (2002), Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV L. 
REV. 5, 129 (2001), and JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 101–04 (1980), with, e.g., 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004), Larry Alexander & Frederick 
Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362–63 (1997), 
Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA 
L. REV. 1267, 1275 (1996), and Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer’s Clear Mistake, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 269, 
275 (1993). 
29. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW (1990); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987); ELY, supra note 28; 
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY (1982); MARK TUSHNET, RED, 
WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).  
30. See David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical 
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 PENN. L. REV. 541 (1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987); 
Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995). 
31. While usually not complete, deference is one historical value inherent in the concept of 
judicial review. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal 
Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 665 (2000); Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1073 (2008).  
32. To be sure, state statutes enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. For an interesting 
discussion about the tension between this presumption and judicial review, see F. Andrew Hessick, 
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her political will, essentially acting as a super-legislator, using 
“constitutional interpretation” to substitute his or her political judgment for 
the determination of the legislature.33 As discussed below, the ideal falls 
somewhere between these two extremes, and seeks to balance some level of 
deference to state legislative enactments with the protection of individual 
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.34 
The substitution of judicial will for legislative will and the larger 
justifications for the proper scope of judicial review have long been the 
subject of academic debate, framed as a counter-majoritarian difficulty.35 
The difficulty arises with the replacement of the views of the many 
“people”—the democratic majority—with the views of judges or justices—
the political minority— in deciding cases. One attempt to justify such 
judicial review comes from the famous footnote four of the Court’s decision 
in Carolene Products.36 There the Court indicated that judicial intervention 
was more likely to be appropriate where legislation falls within the 
protections of individual liberties in the Bill of Rights or otherwise is 
discriminatory.37 Statutes that impose cruel and unusual punishments would 
presumably fall within the situations where exercise of judicial will over 
                                                 
Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447 (2010).  
33. Interestingly, “activist” interpretations can stem from both original meaning and living 
constitution forms of interpretation. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional 
Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007). 
34. As I have argued elsewhere, the deference accorded to state legislatures under the Eighth 
Amendment has historically been excessive and compromised the individual rights of criminal 
defendants. William W. Berry III, Unusual Deference, 69 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn. 
com/abstract=2922802 [hereinafter Berry, Unusual Deference]. 
35. See sources cited supra note 7 (posing the problem of the counter-majoritarian difficulty).  
36. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).  
37. The famous footnote provided: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as 
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced 
within the Fourteenth.  
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes 
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be 
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than are most other types of legislation. . . . 
. . . . 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed 
at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call 
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.  
Id. (citations omitted).  
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political will would be appropriate on the basis of protecting individual 
constitutional rights.38 
To be sure, the Court has established itself as the institution that 
determines which institution has the ultimate authority to interpret the 
Constitution and, in most cases, accords itself the position of being that final 
arbiter.39 To the extent that state legislatures pass overreaching statutes that 
infringe upon individual rights protected in the Constitution, the Court plays 
an important role as a counter-majoritarian check against such lawless 
majorities.40 Indeed, without the Court, states could legislate away core 
fundamental rights, particularly ones involving unpopular expression or 
manifestation.41 
At the other extreme, interpreting the opaque language of the 
Constitution to strike down state legislative enactments can, in theory, allow 
the political views of five justices on the Supreme Court to trump the 
political will of a majority of state legislators. This “judicial activism,” often 
discussed as a counter-majoritarian difficulty, underscores questions of the 
proper scope of judicial review and can strike at the legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court itself. Those who oppose such action by the Court cite the 
difficulty of reversing the Court’s opinions; by interpreting the Constitution 
to have a particular meaning, the legislature is unable to overcome that view, 
short of amending the Constitution. 
This Article does not seek to rehash the voluminous debates concerning 
the proper scope of judicial review.42 Rather, it aims to explore the self-
                                                 
38. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103–04 (1958) (plurality opinion); Weems v. United 
States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910). 
39. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177–78 (1803); HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT 
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 92–93 (1st ed. 1953) (discussing 
constitutional interpretation in light of Marbury). 
40. Judicial review of legislative enactments in this manner is well-established. See, e.g., THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 31, at 466 (referencing “courts of justice, whose duty it must be to 
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void”); id. at 467 (“[E]very act of a 
delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void.”); 1 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 542, at 405 (Melville 
M. Bigelow ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1994) (1833); BICKEL, supra note 7, at 1 (“The power which 
distinguishes the Supreme Court of the United States is that of constitutional review of actions of the 
other branches of government, federal and state.”); Judicial Review, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th 
ed. 2004) (defining judicial review as “[a] court’s power to review the actions of other branches or levels 
of government; esp., the courts’ power to invalidate legislative and executive actions as being 
unconstitutional”); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 6 
(1980) (referencing “the power of judicial review to declare unconstitutional legislative, executive, or 
administrative action”). 
41. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Inescapability of Constitutional Theory, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 935, 935–36 (2013) (book review); BICKEL, supra note 7, at 52–53.  
42. To be sure, there are wide range of views concerning this subject. Compare MARK V. 
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 175–76 (1999) (advocating for a 
constitutional amendment to abolish judicial review), with Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of 
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regulation of some justices in the application of the Eighth Amendment to 
state criminal statutes, particularly in light of their own comments on the 
appropriateness of judicial intervention and regulation in this context. 
A. The Spectrum of Judicial Review 
The core question this Article begins with is where the Court might fall 
on the spectrum from judicial deference to judicial activism with respect to 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments. As 
discussed below, the core doctrine the Court has used to assess punishment 
is the evolving standards of decency. The language of the constitutional 
provision itself though—“nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”43—
does not provide any clue as to the degree of deference, if any, the Court 
ought to apply when assessing the constitutionality of particular 
punishments. 
To frame the question, I propose five broad Eighth Amendment 
categories of judicial review—complete deference, majoritarian-outlier, 
hybrid, proportionality, and normative. First, the Court could elect to defer 
entirely to state punishment practices, finding that all punishments adopted 
by states are constitutional (complete deference). This complete deference 
approach would never strike down any punishments, no matter how 
excessive or draconian. 
Second, the Court could adopt a majoritarian-outlier approach, where it 
upholds all punishments that are not rare or unusual in light of the majority 
practice (majoritarian-outlier). In this approach, the Court would examine 
the majority practices and only strike down state punishment practices that 
are outliers, inconsistent with the majority approach. 
Third, the Court could adopt a hybrid approach where it mixes the 
majoritarian-outlier approach with a second question—whether the 
punishment is proportional in light of the criminal conduct (hybrid). There 
are a number of ways that the Court could do this, but one way would be to 
assess whether the punishment in question is proportional to the purposes 
                                                 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1881, 1924 (1991) (arguing that “judicial review is 
itself an institution so firmly established . . . that its continued existence is utterly unassailable.”). See 
also Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 
72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257 (2004). 
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The text also does not indicate whether “and” is conjunctive, 
disjunctive, or a hendiadys. For differing views on this question, see Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth 
Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 567 (2010); Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary AND Proper” and “Cruel AND Unusual”: 
Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687 (2016); John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning 
of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 468–69 n.167 (2017). 
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of punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.44 
This hybrid approach would find a punishment unconstitutional when the 
punishment is both an outlier and disproportionate. 
Fourth, the Court could simply apply the proportionality test to assess 
the punishment (proportionality). Here, the Court would simply assess 
whether one or more of the purposes of punishment justify the punishment, 
making it proportional. Disproportionate punishments under this approach 
would be unconstitutional. 
Fifth, the Court could apply its own normative political views to the 
punishment to determine its constitutionality (normative). Under this 
approach, justices would apply their normative, political views as to 
whether the punishment in question is appropriate or excessive. 
Of the approaches, only the fourth and fifth are truly counter-
majoritarian. To the extent that the Court’s primary role is to protect 
individual rights from majoritarian tyranny, one of these two approaches is 
necessary.45 The Court, of course, could adopt other methods of determining 
the scope of the meaning of “cruel and unusual” besides proportionality or 
pure normative views, but to remain counter-majoritarian, it would have to 
bring its own judgment to bear, independent of majoritarian practices. 
The other three approaches are majoritarian, at least in part, and defer to 
state legislative practices. Even the hybrid approach, which includes the 
justices’ own analysis, requires that a majoritarian practice exist before 
striking down a particular state practice.  
What is clear, nonetheless, is that none of these three majoritarian 
approaches create any meaningful counter-majoritarian difficulty. There is 
no concern about the justices overruling the practices of the states because 
they are only striking down minority jurisdictions, if they are striking down 
any statutes at all. Thus, the content of the constitutional provision is 
majoritarian, aligning the judicial and legislative will, at least holistically. 
As explained below, this observation has significant consequences for 
the future application of the Eighth Amendment, as the Court has employed 
the hybrid approach described above for over three decades. If the Court 
continues to use a majoritarian standard, the counter-majoritarian difficulty 
ceases to be an impediment in applying the Eighth Amendment to minority 
(and disproportionate) punishment practices. 
                                                 
44. Proportionality in this sense could refer just to retribution, see John F. Stinneford, Rethinking 
Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 961 (2011), but 
a better approach would be to measure proportionality in light of all of the purposes of punishment. See 
William W. Berry III, Separating Retribution from Proportionality: A Response to Stinneford, 97 VA. 
L. REV. BRIEF 61, 62 (2011) [hereinafter Berry, Separating Retribution from Proportionality]. 
45. I have argued this elsewhere. See Berry, Unusual Deference, supra note 34, at 18.  
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B. Evolving Standards: The Eighth Amendment Model  
The Eighth Amendment story is one of judicial deference to states and 
hesitancy to protect the individual rights of defendants. The presumption of 
many justices has been that states know best how to determine what 
punishments are appropriate for criminal offenders, even when such 
punishments are, by most accounts, excessive in light of the culpability of 
the offender and the harm caused.46 
On this issue, Justice Blackman’s dissent in Furman v. Georgia is 
instructive.47 In voting to uphold Georgia’s death penalty statute, Blackmun 
indicated that were he a legislator, he would vote against capital 
punishment, but as a justice, striking down Georgia’s statute as 
unconstitutional would exceed his authority.48 The other dissenting justices 
in Furman expressed similar concerns.49 After Furman, the Court went over 
twenty years without applying this doctrine to create substantive limits on 
criminal punishments, with a couple of exceptions.50 Similarly, Justice 
Scalia’s dissents in Atkins v. Virginia51 and Roper v. Simmons52 chastised 
his fellow justices on the Court for allegedly substituting their personal 
views for those of legislators.53  
                                                 
46. This has been particularly true in the non-capital context. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 
63, 66, 77 (2003) (affirming on habeas review two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life for 
stealing approximately $150 of videotapes, where defendant had three prior felony convictions); Ewing 
v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18, 30–31 (2003) (affirming sentence of twenty-five years to life for stealing 
approximately $1,200 of golf clubs, where defendant had four prior felony convictions); Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 994 (1991) (affirming sentence of life without parole for first offense of 
possessing 672 grams of cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370–72 (1982) (per curiam) (affirming 
two consecutive sentences of twenty years for possession with intent to distribute and distribution of 
nine ounces of marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265–66, 285 (1980) (affirming life with 
parole sentence for felony theft of $120.75 by false pretenses where defendant had two prior 
convictions); but see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281–84 (1983) (reversing by a 5–4 vote a sentence 
of life without parole for presenting a no account check for $100, where defendant had six prior felony 
convictions); see also Barkow, supra note 26, at 1146–47. 
47. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
48. Id. at 406 (“Were I a legislator, I would vote against the death penalty for the policy reasons 
argued by counsel for the respective petitioners and expressed and adopted in the several opinions filed 
by the Justices who vote to reverse these judgments.”) This is particularly ironic in light of Blackmun’s 
opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
49. See supra note 5. 
50. See discussion infra Part II. 
51. 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
52. 543 U.S. 551, 607 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
53. As explained below, the majority legislative view in both cases was consistent with the 
Court’s decisions. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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Part of the Court’s hesitancy with respect to the Eighth Amendment may 
stem from the public backlash to its decision in Furman.54 Removing the 
ability of states to impose the death penalty was met with significant 
resistance and perhaps has made some on the Court think twice about 
limiting punishments. The Court’s cases demonstrate this outcome, with the 
Court not establishing any meaningful categorical limits on sentences until 
2002.55  
Indeed, the Court’s evolving standards of decency test itself reflects this 
deference to state legislatures. This standard is a hybrid one—it first 
examines the majority view of state legislatures before examining whether 
the purposes of punishment justify the kind of sentence in question. 
The evolving standards doctrine assesses the punishment at issue in two 
ways.56 First, the Court examines the societal consensus with respect to the 
punishment at issue (“objective indicia”).57 The predominant indicator of 
societal consensus for the Court has been the number of state and federal 
governments that authorize the punishment, resulting in a counting of state 
jurisdictions.58 If less than half of the jurisdictions allow the punishment, it 
is evidence that the punishment might be suspect, and the societal standard 
might have moved away from the punishment.59 
Second, the Court brings its “own judgment” to bear (“subjective 
indicia”).60 In this analysis, the Court asks whether any of the purposes of 
punishment—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation—
justify the use of the punishment.61 Specifically, this proportionality 
                                                 
54. Lain, supra note 2.  
55. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 417–18; James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: 
The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 40 (2007).  
56. In practice, these assessments can occur on three different levels—the type of punishment, 
the method used to impose the punishment, and the technique used to implement the punishment. See 
William W. Berry III & Meghan J. Ryan, Cruel Techniques, Unusual Secrets, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 407 
(2017) [hereinafter Berry & Ryan, Cruel Techniques, Unusual Secrets] (developing a taxonomy of the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions). This Article largely focuses on the first category—the 
punishment itself. 
57. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (applying this doctrine to bar 
execution of intellectually disabled offenders); Roper, 543 U.S. at 563–67 (same for execution of 
juvenile offenders). 
58. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313–17; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–67. The Court has relied on other 
indicators, including jury sentencing outcomes and international norms, but the legislative trends have 
provided the most consistent barometer. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313–17; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564–
67.  
59. While this approach is not without analogs among other constitutional provisions, see 
Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV. 365 (2009), it 
contains the fundamental flaw that it populates a counter-majoritarian standard—the Eighth 
Amendment—with majoritarian consensus. See Berry, Unusual Deference, supra note 34, at 38. 
60. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977). 
61. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–46 (2008) (applying this principle); 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71–75 (2010) (same). Interestingly, the Court has always reached the 
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analysis62 measures the relationship between the punishment and the 
purpose in context to determine whether the punishment is excessive in light 
of the characteristics of the offender and the nature of the crime.63 
Since the doctrine’s adoption, the Court has used the evolving standards 
of decency in holding that the Eighth Amendment bars death sentences for 
rapes,64 for some felony murder crimes,65 for intellectually disabled 
offenders,66 and for juvenile offenders,67 as well as for JLWOP sentences 
imposed for non-homicide crimes.68 
Even so, this line of cases has affected a relatively small number of 
criminal offenders; compared to the over 2.3 million in prison in the United 
States, these constitutional limits merely seem like a baby step in the right 
direction. As the next section demonstrates, all of these cases reflect a 
majoritarian view concerning the disproportionate nature of the sentence. 
II. EIGHTH AMENDMENT MAJORITARIANISM 
While the Court’s forays into applying the Eighth Amendment have been 
few, each decision to do so first reflected a determination that the situational 
punishment ban was a minority or unusual practice. Indeed, in applying the 
Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of decency doctrine, the Court has 
never brought its own judgment to bear without examining the majority 
trend with respect to sentencing in the manner at issue before the Court. 
This Section demonstrates the majoritarian nature of the Court’s cases by 
briefly exploring the genesis of the doctrine and its subsequent evolution. 
A. Coker, Enmund, & Tison: Early Applications  
In Coker, the Court first looked to the practice of state legislatures with 
                                                 
same conclusion with respect to both questions—the majoritarian standard of societal consensus and the 
determination of whether a purpose of punishment justifies the use of the punishment. 
62. See supra note 44. 
63. See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441–46 (applying this principle); Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–75 
(same). 
64. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 434 (barring capital sentences for all non-homicide crimes, including 
child rape); Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (barring capital sentences for the crime of rape). 
65. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (striking down a felony murder conviction 
where defendant did not kill or intend to kill); but see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 138 (1987) 
(narrowing the holding in Enmund and allowing a capital sentence for individuals playing a major role 
in the crime without intent to kill). See also Guyora Binder et al., Capital Punishment of Unintentional 
Felony Murder, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141, 1206 (2017) (arguing for a mens rea standard of 
recklessness in capital felony murder cases). 
66. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 
(2014); Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017). 
67. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).  
68. Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
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respect to permitting the death penalty as a punishment for rape.69 Prior to 
Furman, sixteen states permitted the death penalty for rape.70 At the time of 
Coker, however, Georgia was the only state that made rape of an adult 
woman a capital offense.71  
The Court also examined jury sentencing decisions and found that 
Georgia had, since the reinstatement of the death penalty, sentenced five 
rapists to death out of sixty-three cases that the Georgia Supreme Court 
reviewed.72 Georgia juries imposed a capital sentence in less than 10 percent 
of rape cases.73 
Finally, the Court brought its own judgment to bear, determining that 
death was a disproportionate penalty for a rape offense.74 Despite the 
acknowledged seriousness of rape, the Court found that it did not merit 
death, even with aggravating circumstances.75 On several levels—
legislative majority, legislative trend, and jury verdicts, the majority 
consensus was that rape constituted an outlier as a basis for the death 
penalty, making it a candidate for constitutional exclusion under the Court’s 
majoritarian doctrine. 
In Enmund v. Florida, the Court applied the same majoritarian evolving 
standards of decency analysis as in Coker.76 Enmund concerned the use of 
the death penalty for a felony murder conviction where the crime was 
robbery and another committed the killing.77 Of the thirty-six jurisdictions 
that permitted the death penalty at the time, the Court noted that only eight 
jurisdictions authorized the death penalty for accomplices in felony murder 
robbery cases like Enmund without proof of additional aggravating 
circumstances.78 In addition, another nine states allowed death sentences for 
felony murder accomplices where other aggravating factors were present.79 
The Court found that the legislative practice weighed “on the side of 
rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue.”80  
                                                 
69. Coker, 433 U.S. at 586 (1977). 
70. Id. at 593.  
71. Id. at 595–96. As the Court noted, Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee authorized the death 
penalty for child rape at the time of Coker. Id. at 595. 
72. Id. at 596–97. 
73. Id. 
74. The Court did not specifically refer to the purposes of punishment, but the concept of 
proportionality implicitly refers to such aims. I have discussed this at length in other articles. See Berry, 
Separating Retribution from Proportionality, supra note 44, at 61; William W. Berry III, Promulgating 
Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69 (2011) [hereinafter Berry, Promulgating Proportionality]. 
75. 433 U.S. at 600.  
76. 458 U.S. 782, 788–89 (1982).  
77. Id. at 783–87.  
78. Id. at 789.  
79. Id. at 791.  
80. Id. at 793. The Court also considered jury sentences, although a difficult proposition given 
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As in Coker, the Court in Enmund brought its own judgment to bear, 
finding that the death sentence was inappropriate for Enmund.81 
Interestingly, the Court held that criminal culpability did not rise to the level 
required by just deserts retribution to warrant a death sentence.82 The Court 
similarly dismissed deterrence as a supporting rationale for a death sentence 
in Enmund’s case.83 Finally, it is important to note that the Court’s decision 
in Enmund appeared to focus only on his particular sentence.84 The Court 
did not explicitly create a categorical rule with respect to death sentences 
for felony murder convictions.85  
The Court narrowed the scope of Enmund five years later in Tison v. 
Arizona, where it again considered the Eighth Amendment limitations on 
felony murder in capital cases through its majoritarian lens.86 Tison involved 
the prosecution of the two sons of Gary Tison, who brutally murdered a 
family after carjacking their car.87 The sons participated both in helping 
Tison break out of prison and in the carjacking.88 They were not present, 
however, when their father killed the family and were unaware that he 
intended to do so.89 
The Court in Tison applied the same counting of state legislatures as in 
Enmund, but combined the jurisdictions that allowed felony murder for any 
accomplice with those that only allowed felony murder with additional 
aggravating circumstances.90 The Court reasoned that, unlike Enmund, the 
Tison sons played an active role in the crime (particularly the prison escape), 
and as a result both categories of jurisdictions should count, leading to a 
finding that only eleven jurisdictions did not allow death sentences in felony 
murder cases like Tison. 91  
The Court’s subjective judgment likewise found that the death sentences 
                                                 
the variety in felony murder cases and state felony murder laws. Id. at 794–96.  
81. Id. at 797.  
82. Id. at 800–01.  
83. Id. at 799–800. To be fair, retribution appears to be the only purpose that could justify the 
death penalty, and it might not accomplish that. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
84. 458 U.S. at 801. 
85. Id. 
86. 481 U.S. 137, 152–58 (1987).  
87. Id. at 139–41. For a chilling account of Gary Tison’s escape from prison and subsequent 
crime spree, see JAMES W. CLARKE, LAST RAMPAGE: THE ESCAPE OF GARY TISON (1988). 
88. 481 U.S. at 139–40.  
89. Id. at 141. Tison died of exposure in the desert after a police manhunt. His death may have 
increased the public desire (or at least that of the prosecutor) to seek death sentences for his sons. See 
CLARKE, supra note 87. 
90. 481 U.S. at 152–55. 
91. Id. The Court focused on the recklessness demonstrated by the sons in busting Tison out of 
prison, particularly considering their knowledge of his dangerous character and criminal past. Id. at 151–
52. 
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imposed on the Tison sons were not disproportionate.92 Specifically, the 
Court cited the reckless endangerment of the Tison sons as providing a level 
of intent that made a death sentence appropriate even though the sons did 
not participate in the killing itself.93 The distinction, then, between the 
outcomes in Enmund and Tison was the intent of the felony murder 
accomplices.94 Unlike in Enmund and Coker, the Court made clear that the 
majority view did not provide a consensus view in favor of eliminating the 
application of the punishment at issue.95 
For fifteen years after Enmund, the Court did not apply the evolving 
standards of decency doctrine or the Eighth Amendment to a substantive 
punishment. Then, in 2002, the Court began applying the doctrine to a series 
of cases, deciding six cases over the next twelve years.  
B. Atkins, Roper, & Kennedy: The Death Penalty  
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held that the evolving standards of 
decency and the Eighth Amendment prohibited death sentences for 
intellectually disabled offenders.96 The Court again applied the majoritarian 
objective indicia, focusing again on state legislative practices that permitted 
such sentences.97 Thirty states, including twelve states that prohibited 
capital punishment, proscribed the execution of intellectually disabled 
offenders.98 Further, the Court emphasized that “[i]t is not so much the 
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction 
of change[,]”99 noting that seventeen of the states banning the execution of 
intellectually disabled offenders had done so in the decade since the Court’s 
decision in Penry.100 Finally, the Court gave weight to the absence of new 
state legislation authorizing executions of intellectually disabled offenders, 
                                                 
92. Id. at 155–58. 
93. Id. at 157–58. 
94. Id. For an argument that a recklessness mens rea should be required for capital punishment 
for felony murder, see Binder et al., supra note 65, at 1142.  
95. 481 U.S. at 157–58. 
96. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).  
97. Id. at 313–17.  
98. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313–15). Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Atkins took issue with the counting method, instead claiming that eighteen out of 
thirty-eight death-penalty states (47%) had banned such executions—not enough to establish a national 
consensus. 536 U.S. at 342 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
99. 536 U.S. at 315. Interestingly, the Court also cited three other states that currently had bills 
pending that would ban the execution of intellectually disabled offenders. Id.  
100. Id. at 314–15. See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 304. The Court had reached the opposite conclusion in Penry but reversed that decision in Atkins 
based in part on the legislative shift (demonstrating national consensus). 536 U.S. at 314–16. 
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as well as the small number of executions after Penry.101  
With respect to the subjective indicia, the Court in Atkins determined that 
none of the purposes of punishment justified the execution of intellectually 
disabled offenders.102 The purpose of retribution did not justify execution of 
intellectually disabled offenders, according to the Court, because such 
offenders by definition did not possess the required culpability.103 The Court 
similarly found that exempting the intellectually disabled from the death 
penalty would have no effect on the ability of the death penalty to deter 
criminal offenders.104 
Three years later, the Court applied similar reasoning in Roper v. 
Simmons, holding that the evolving standards of decency and the Eighth 
Amendment prohibited death sentences for juvenile offenders.105 As in 
Atkins, the application of the majoritarian objective indicia commenced with 
counting the state laws, and like Atkins, thirty states prohibited the execution 
of juvenile offenders (twelve of which banned the death penalty 
altogether).106 Also like Atkins, the Court in Roper was assessing whether 
the evolving standards of decency provided enough evidence of changed 
circumstances to reverse its prior decision in Stanford v. Kentucky sixteen 
years earlier.107 
The Court also noted the presence of objective evidence moving toward 
ending juvenile executions, although only five states (as compared to 
sixteen in Atkins) had abandoned the juvenile death penalty since 
Stanford.108 Further, no state had, as in Atkins, reinstated the juvenile death 
penalty since Stanford.109 
With respect to the subjective standards, the Court developed the idea 
that juveniles were offenders that, by definition, possessed a diminished 
                                                 
101. 536 U.S. at 316. 
102. Id. at 318–20. 
103. Id. at 319. 
104. Id. at 319–20. The Court also focused on the likelihood of error as a reason for abolishing 
the execution of intellectually disabled offenders. Id. at 320–21. The likelihood of false confessions and 
the offender’s inability to aid the lawyer in his defense rested at the heart of this concern. Id. 
Interestingly, the Court in Atkins did not address the broader question of whether the holding applied to 
mental illness as well as mental retardation. And it failed to even define mental retardation, leaving that 
determination up to individual states. For an exploration of possible applications of Atkins to mentally 
ill offenders through the intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Nita A. Farahany, 
Cruel and Unequal Punishment, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 859 (2009). 
105. 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
106. Id. at 564–65. 
107. Id. Stanford held that the execution of seventeen-year-old offenders did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment. 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. at 551. 
108. 543 U.S. at 565. Even though the change in Roper was less pronounced than in Atkins, the 
Court still emphasized that it found it “significant.” Id. 
109. Id. at 566.  
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level of culpability.110 Specifically, the Court cited the (1) lack of maturity 
and undeveloped sense of responsibility, (2) the susceptibility of juveniles 
to outside pressures and negative influences, and (3) the unformed nature of 
juveniles’ character as compared to adults.111 
In light of the diminished level of culpability, the purposes of 
punishment, in the Court’s view, failed to justify the imposition of juvenile 
death sentences.112 Such death sentences failed to achieve the purpose of 
retribution in light of the diminished culpability.113 Likewise, the Court 
concluded that execution of juveniles did not achieve a deterrent effect—
offenders with diminished capacity will be unlikely to be susceptible to 
deterrence.114 In addition, the Court found no evidence that a juvenile death 
sentence would add any deterrent value beyond that achieved by a LWOP 
sentence.115 
One other important aspect of the decision in Roper bears mentioning. 
At the end of its analysis, the Court also cited to the relevance of 
international standards and practices in determining the meaning of the 
evolving standards.116 In particular, the Court emphasized that the United 
States was the only country in the world that permitted the juvenile death 
penalty.117 Again, the majoritarian approach to judicial review explains the 
Court’s decision to strike down the statute—the broad consensus, at home 
and abroad, justified the Court’s action and captured the political shift since 
its prior decision in Stanford. 
Three years later, the Court expanded its holding in Coker in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, striking down Louisiana’s child rape statute under the Eighth 
Amendment.118 Specifically, the Court held that the evolving standards of 
decency foreclosed the imposition of a death sentence for all non-homicide 
crimes against individuals.119 
In applying the majoritarian objective indicia, the Court determined that 
forty-four states did not allow capital punishment for child rape.120 As this 
number exceeded the number of states in Atkins (thirty), Roper (thirty), and 
Enmund (forty-two), the Court concluded that the objective consensus 
                                                 
110. Id. at 569–70. 
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banned child rape.121 As with the earlier cases, the majority approach drives 
the content of the cruel and unusual punishment proscription and defines 
which punishments have become unconstitutional. 
With respect to the subjective indicia, the Kennedy Court explained that 
retribution did not justify a penalty of death for a child rape because, as 
indicated in Coker, such a penalty was disproportionate.122 With respect to 
deterrence, the Court concluded that the crime of child rape is 
underreported, and allowing the death penalty as a punishment would only 
increase the incentive to hide the crime.123 As such, death for child rape 
would likely not advance the purpose of deterrence.124  
C. Graham & Miller: JLWOP  
Two years after Kennedy, the Court decided Graham v. Florida, 
applying its decision in Kennedy to JLWOP sentences.125 Graham was 
particularly significant in that it applied the evolving standards of decency 
doctrine to a non-homicide crime for the first time.126 Prior to Graham, the 
Court had reserved this majoritarian doctrine to capital cases, resting on its 
differentness principle127 as the basis for the doctrine’s limited 
application.128 In Graham, however, the Court made clear that JLWOP 
                                                 
121. Id. at 425–26. Interestingly, the Court discounted the direction of change, as six states had 
adopted statutes allowing the death penalty for child rape in the five years prior to Kennedy. Id. at 431–
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implicit reason for the Court’s view here might be the idea that the evolving standards of decency only 
evolve in one direction—away from severe punishments. See Stinneford, supra note 27, at 1825. 
122. 554 U.S. at 441–42. 
123. Id. at 444–45. 
124. Id. at 445.  
125. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). 
126. This practice was quite curious given that the evolving standards of decency concept emerged 
predominately from non-capital cases. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
127. The Court has long held that “death is different.” See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
187 (1976) (“There is no question that death as a punishment is unique in its severity and 
irrevocability.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (death differs from life 
imprisonment because of its “finality”); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 n.7 (1984) (“[T]he death 
sentence is unique in its severity and in its irrevocability . . . .”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 616–17 
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numerous persons on death row are unreliable is especially alarming). Justice Brennan’s concurrence in 
Furman v. Georgia is apparently the origin of the Court’s “death is different” capital jurisprudence. 
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 5, at 370 (crediting Justice Brennan as the originator of this line of 
argument); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Death is 
a unique punishment in the United States.”); Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and 
the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 118 (2004) (discussing the Court’s death-is-
different jurisprudence).  
128. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (2009) (acknowledging the 
Court’s different treatment of capital cases); Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time? Examining 
the Supreme Court’s “Culture of Death,” 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 861 (2008). 
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sentences are “different” too for the purpose of the evolving standards of 
decency and the Eighth Amendment.129 At the time, it was not clear whether 
the juvenile character of the offender, the punishment of LWOP, or both, 
constituted the differentness.130 
On the heels of the Court’s decision in Roper five years earlier, the public 
had become increasingly interested in the degree to which juveniles should 
receive adult punishments.131 With the death penalty unavailable, it was 
natural that increased scrutiny concerning JLWOP became part of the 
democratic consciousness. 
With respect to the majoritarian objective indicia, the Court in Graham 
recognized that a majority of states permitted JLWOP sentences in non-
homicide cases, particularly rape.132 The Court, however, found that the 
legislative analysis was less important than the actual sentencing practices 
with respect to JLWOP in non-homicide cases.133 Because only 123 
offenders were serving JLWOP for non-homicide crimes, the Court found 
a national consensus against JLWOP.134 For the Court, the relationship 
between the number of such sentences as compared to the opportunity for 
their imposition provided the basis for its analysis.135  
As to the subjective indicia, the Court expanded upon its discussion in 
the Roper case concerning the lessened culpability of juvenile offenders.136 
In addition, the Court emphasized the diminished culpability of offenders 
that do not commit homicide.137 The “twice diminished moral culpability” 
combining the offender (juvenile) and the offense (non-homicide) made 
JLWOP, a kind of death sentence, a disproportionate punishment.138 As a 
result, the Court found that the purpose of retribution does not justify 
JLWOP.139 Deterrence likewise did not justify JLWOP sentences in non-
                                                 
129. 560 U.S. at 79. 
130. See William W. Berry III, More Different than Life, Less Different than Death, 71 OHIO ST. 
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homicide cases because juveniles are less susceptible to deterrence, and 
deterrence does not offer a justification for disproportionate punishments.140 
Two years later, in Miller v. Alabama, the Court followed its approach 
in Graham, again applying a categorical exclusion to juvenile offenders.141 
The Court held in Miller that the evolving standards of decency and the 
Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of mandatory JLWOP 
sentences,142 mirroring its prior decision in Woodson v. North Carolina, 
which proscribed mandatory death sentences.143 
The Court in Miller also clarified that the differentness at issue was the 
juvenile character of the offender.144 The Court explained, that if “‘death is 
different,’ children are different too.”145 This makes sense as the character 
of juveniles, and the popular reconsideration of juvenile offenses, provided 
the basis for the Court to expand its doctrine. 
Given that the case rested at the confluence of two doctrines—the 
juveniles are different of Graham and the evolving standards AND the 
individualized sentencing requirement (and prohibition of mandatory death 
sentences) of Woodson—the Court applied a synthesized approach that 
looked at both doctrines.146  
As to the majoritarian objective indicia of the evolving standards of 
decency, the Court determined that twenty-nine states allowed mandatory 
JLWOP sentences.147 As in Graham (where thirty-nine jurisdictions 
allowed the practice at issue), the Court in Miller de-emphasized the overall 
importance of state counting as the prime determinant of the objective 
inquiry.148 Rather, in most cases, the mandatory JLWOP sentences resulted 
from a confluence of two statutes—one that provided for juveniles to be 
tried as adults in some situations, and one that imposed the mandatory 
LWOP sentence.149  
Because states had not considered these together in one determination 
about the propriety of mandatory JLWOP, the state counting did not create 
dispositive proof of consensus.150 In light of the Court’s concerns related to 
the denial of individualized sentencing rights, the Court did not further 
address whether a consensus existed, but largely presumed its presence in 
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its analysis.151 
With respect to its typical subjective inquiry, the Court recounted its 
application of the purposes of punishment in Graham, and suggested that 
the same conclusions applied in Miller.152 Further, the Court focused on the 
Woodson precedent in emphasizing the need for individualized sentencing 
determinations.153 
D. Hall v. Florida and Moore v. Texas: The Most Recent Applications  
The Court’s most recent evolving standards decisions occurred in two 
cases applying the rule from Atkins.154 In both Hall v. Florida and Moore v. 
Texas, the Supreme Court struck down state schemes pursuant to Atkins v. 
Virginia.155 In Hall, the Court held that using IQ as the sole method for 
determining whether intellectual disability existed was unconstitutional.156 
The Court instead required, under the evolving standards, an inquiry into 
other indicia of intellectual disability—meaning that IQ could not serve as 
the sole basis for concluding an offender was not intellectually disabled.157 
In its exploration of majoritarian objective indicia, the Court determined 
that, at most, nine states imposed a strict IQ cutoff at seventy for 
determining intellectual disability.158 “Thus[,] in 41 [s]tates[,] an individual 
in Hall’s position—an individual with an [IQ] score of 71—would not be 
deemed automatically eligible for the death penalty.”159 
Further, the Court highlighted the consistency of the direction of change 
with respect to the use of a strict IQ cutoff.160 In the twelve years since 
Atkins, two states had adopted a strict cutoff, while eleven states had 
abandoned a cutoff or abolished the death penalty altogether.161 
With respect to the subjective indicia, the Court focused on the prevailing 
medical view concerning the relationship between IQ and intellectual 
disability.162 Earlier, it established that none of the purposes of punishment 
justify the execution of intellectually disabled offenders, citing its earlier 
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work in Atkins. Its own judgment, then, related to its view, based on expert 
testimony, that IQ alone was not an adequate measure of intellectual 
disability.163 
Similarly, the Court in Moore struck down the procedure adopted by 
Texas. The approach of Texas to determining intellectual disability was 
similarly an outlier, as prohibited the use of newer medical standards in 
favor of older ones.164 Given the majority consensus against Texas— the 
only state using such an out-of-date approach—the Court had no difficulty 
finding that the test did not meet the objective standards.165 With respect to 
the subjective standards, the Court found that no purpose of punishment 
justified the use of antiquated mental health standards.166 
E. Micro vs. Macro Applications 
When considering the Court’s evolving standards of decency, their 
trajectory, and the potential future applications of the doctrine, it is worth 
noting that none of the decisions had the effect of completely excluding a 
particular punishment. Both JLWOP and the death penalty have survived. 
Instead, the Court’s categorical rules have operated on a micro-level, 
excluding the death penalty or JLWOP as an available punishment based on 
the character of the offender or the character of the offense. 
The individual impact of such decisions can be quite significant—the 
difference between life and death or prison and parole. The systemic effect, 
though, remains somewhat small, given the limited number of offenders that 
fall into the excluded category as compared to the overall number of 
offenders serving the punishment at issue. The number of death sentences 
for juveniles before Roper, for instance, pales in comparison to overall death 
row population. Similarly, the number of child rape death sentences at the 
time of Kennedy, constituted a very small percentage of death sentences, 
particularly because almost all jurisdictions had a legislative prohibition 
against such sentences already. 
The open question, then, is whether the Court will extend the evolving 
standards of decency beyond its pattern of micro-applications to extend to 
macro-applications. Specifically, one wonders whether the next step in the 
evolving standards of decency is to declare that a particular punishment is 
always cruel and unusual.  
As explored below, the leading candidates for such a determination are 
the death penalty and JLWOP. The doctrine itself, including its theoretical 
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underpinnings as a doctrine that evolves over time, certainly does not 
foreclose a macro application.  
III. EVOLVED STANDARDS (MICRO LEVEL) 
In light of the Court’s evolving standards of decency and its prior 
applications, the next question is whether the usage of certain punishments 
has evolved such that they contravene the Eighth Amendment. Because 
there is no counter-majoritarian issue, the Court is free to evolve to catch up 
with the majoritarian shifts in society with respect to different punishments. 
This section explores potential applications on a micro-level—involving 
certain applications of the doctrine to otherwise permissible punishments. 
The next section explores potential applications on a macro-level—to 
eliminate a punishment entirely under the Eighth Amendment. 
As indicated below, the micro exclusions tend to involve punishments 
where the exclusion fits with the Court’s prior rationale and have a current 
subjective rationale that justifies Eighth Amendment application. In most 
cases, the majoritarian consensus is not there with reference to the exclusion 
because state legislatures have not statutorily excluded that practice.  
Nonetheless, a majoritarian basis may exist for all of these exclusions 
because a majoritarian exclusion exists for the crime itself, on a macro level, 
as explored in Part IV. For example, a majority of states may not have 
abolished JLWOP for intellectually disabled offenders, but a majority may 
have abolished JLWOP itself. 
Following the Court’s recent jurisprudence, two kinds of punishment 
currently warrant heightened scrutiny in light of their differentness—
JLWOP and the death penalty. After exploring some possible micro-level 
applications to those two kinds of punishment, the section concludes by 
suggesting other possible candidates for differentness and heightened 
scrutiny. 
A. JLWOP Sentences 
Both of the Court’s JLWOP cases—Graham and Miller—have mirrored 
prior applications of the Eighth Amendment to the death penalty. Graham’s 
categorical prohibition of JLWOP sentences in non-homicide cases is an 
analog to Coker and Kennedy’s prohibition of death sentences in non-
homicide cases (rape and child rape). Similarly, Miller’s categorical 
prohibition of mandatory JLWOP sentences adopts the reasoning of 
Woodson, which barred mandatory death sentences and required 
individualized sentencing consideration. This makes sense, as the public 
consciousness with respect to JLWOP, while not the same as the death 
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penalty, has significantly expanded under the label of its own kind of 
differentness.167 
The obvious place, then, to look for the next categorical JLWOP 
exemption is to the remaining death penalty exemptions. After Graham and 
Miller, the two other categories of cases are felony murder cases (Enmund 
/ Tison) and intellectually disabled offenders (Atkins).  
1. Felony Murders 
As explored above, the application of the death penalty to felony murder 
offenders has two different Eighth Amendment rules. Where the offender 
played a minor role and demonstrated no intent to kill, Enmund appears to 
bar death sentences. By contrast, where the offender played a more 
significant role and exhibited some intent, even if recklessness, Tison 
suggests that the Eighth Amendment does not place a limitation on death 
sentences. 
A logical application of the Enmund/Tison principle to JLWOP cases 
could in theory bar JLWOP sentences in felony murder cases where the 
offender played a minor role and did not display any intent to commit 
murder.  
The objective indicia indicate that states place some limits on felony 
murder. But the limits are in the cases that fall within the doctrine, not with 
respect to the punishment itself. As a result, the objective criteria would not 
be met in this context unless the Court were willing to draw lines as to how 
states could define felony murder itself, much like the ALI has done with 
the Model Penal Code.168 The political will would need to arise, as in Miller, 
from some source other than state-counting. Unfortunately, as with 
Enmund/Tison, the view of felony murder generally will not be enough to 
establish a complete categorical exception; the objectionable nature of the 
felony murder doctrine comes from its unfairness in certain factual 
situations (like in Enmund). If the Court, as it is likely to do, continues to 
operate under the majoritarian principle, a majoritarian limitation on 
JLWOP in felony murder cases must relate to the specific situation, or kind 
of situation, at issue. 
The subjective indicia by contrast would strongly support adoption of 
this felony murder exception. As the Court has indicated, a LWOP sentence 
in many ways constitutes its own kind of death sentence.169 Under the 
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purposes of punishment, the punishment of JLWOP would not accord the 
felony murder accomplice his just deserts; it would result in an excessive 
sentence. The JLWOP sentence for an individual who was a minor 
participant in a crime, who did not kill, and who did not intend to kill would 
not achieve the purpose of retribution based on the offender’s diminished 
culpability. Deterrence would also not result from the imposition of such a 
sentence because future offenders in similar cases also would not intend to 
kill and would only act in a minor role in the crime.  
Incapacitation also does not justify JLWOP sentences for minor felony 
murder participants without intent to murder, because such offenders are 
unlikely to be inherently dangerous individuals. Merely being in the 
presence of a murder should not serve as the aggravating fact that condemns 
an offender to die in prison. Finally, rehabilitation counsels against JWLOP 
sentences generally, and specifically where rehabilitation appears a real 
possibility. Certainly, offenders like Enmund have not exhibited any 
behavior during the felony murder that would provide a basis for concluding 
that a JLWOP sentence is necessary to rehabilitate them. 
Limiting the imposition of JLWOP in this context could be very 
significant. Almost one-quarter of all JLWOP sentences result from felony 
murder cases or cases with accomplice liability, and while this approach 
might not result in complete categorical exclusion, it could further define, 
consistent with majority view, some restrictions on JLWOP in felony 
murder cases.170 
2. Intellectually Disabled Offenders 
The application to JLWOP of the prohibition of intellectually disabled 
offenders receiving capital sentences provides a second logical analog for 
the Supreme Court. The proscription of such sentences rests in part on the 
diminished culpability of such offenders and on the inability of such 
offenders to understand why the state is killing them—an important part of 
retributive justice.171 
It is clear that these concerns have less purchase with JLWOP offenders. 
The juvenile character of JLWOP offenders already takes into account the 
diminished culpability of an offender. It may be difficult to assess the degree 
to which mental disability should further increase the mitigation applied at 
sentencing. In addition, the concern that the offender cannot appreciate the 
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nature of their sentence—that they will die in prison—raises fewer concerns 
than a failure to appreciate that the state will execute them and the reasons 
for their capital sentence.  
Nonetheless, these concepts still provide a basis for expansion of the 
evolving standards of decency consistent with the Court’s decision in 
Atkins. Where juvenile offenders have a low IQ, such offenders may be 
correspondingly less culpable than other offenders. In addition, the JLWOP 
sentence is a kind of death sentence, warranting increased scrutiny by the 
Court under the evolving standards of decency doctrine. 
With respect to objective indicia, there is no national consensus 
concerning the appropriate test to determine intellectual disability. Further, 
states have not placed limitations upon LWOP sentences based on 
intellectual disability. Without shifts in state legislative policy, the objective 
indicia with respect to JLWOP would not be satisfied. The Court could, 
however, look to larger trends, including the overall trend toward abolition 
of JLWOP altogether as a broader basis for restricting JLWOP in this 
context.172 
With respect to the subjective indicia, it is certainly possible to make a 
case that none of the purposes of punishment supports JLWOP sentences 
for intellectually disabled offenders. The purpose of retribution may not 
support JLWOP sentences for intellectually disabled juvenile offenders in 
two senses.  
First, the culpability of such offenders may be lower, in that the 
offender’s mental condition may have inhibited his ability to fully 
appreciate the consequences of his actions and thus lower his level of 
criminal desert.  
Second, the mental condition of the offender may make the 
communication of the public censure so central to retribution difficult to 
achieve. The state may be unable to accomplish the purpose of retribution 
if the offender is unable to understand the relationship between his criminal 
act and his condemnation to die in prison. 
For deterrence, there are similar difficulties related to the intellectual 
disability of the offender. Such offenders are not generally susceptible to 
deterrence. In addition, there is little evidence that JLWOP would provide 
significant marginal deterrence in excess of life sentences.  
With respect to dangerousness, the lower IQ of the offender may suggest 
continued need for incarceration. This sentence is unnecessary to achieve 
this purpose of punishment, however, as allowing for the possibility of 
parole does not mandate a release. Indeed, a life sentence with parole would 
be adequate to assess dangerousness over time, particularly given the youth 
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of the offender. Further, in some cases, other institutions may be preferable 
to prison for some intellectually disabled offenders. To say, then, that 
incapacitation justifies JLWOP for intellectually disabled offenders seems 
dubious because the states could achieve the same purpose with a lesser 
sentence.173 Finally, JLWOP clearly does not achieve the purpose of 
rehabilitation. It forecloses the possibility of the offender returning to 
society. 
The normative sentiments certainly would open the door to a categorical 
exclusion in this context if the Court could find a majoritarian hook for such 
a constitutional interpretation. Rather than creating categorical exceptions, 
however, a better approach would be to abolish JLWOP altogether in light 
of the evolving standards of decency. The Article makes that case in Part IV 
below. 
B. Death Sentences 
1. Mental Illness 
Collectively, Atkins and Hall prohibit the execution of the intellectually 
disabled and develop parameters for determining which offenders fall into 
that category. Intellectual disability, however, is not the only mental 
deficiency that warrants scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment. 
Apart from insanity and intellectual disability, other mental illnesses 
might also bear upon one’s eligibility for the death penalty (given the 
current status quo of permitting executions generally). In most jurisdictions, 
courts and juries weigh mental illness as a mitigating factor when 
considering the death penalty. 
It is possible that certain types of mental illness could rise to the level of 
deserving a categorical exclusion, as with mental retardation. As most states 
do not have a clear statutory prohibition in this context, one must look, as 
the Court did in Miller, to the on-the-ground results in cases involving a 
particular mental illness. Over time, it is possible, and even likely, that 
certain kinds of mental illness will capture the public imagination such that 
they provide an excuse on some level for criminal activity such that the 
majority will is in favor of restricting the death penalty in that context. As 
throughout, shifts in majority view will shape the development of the 
doctrine in this context. 
With respect to subjective indicia, the central arguments with respect to 
retribution would again relate to (1) diminished culpability and (2) inability 
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to censure. For certain mental illnesses, the offender’s diminished 
culpability might provide the basis for determining that retribution is not 
achievable. Similarly, where the offender could not adequately understand 
the state’s condemnation as related to the death sentence, such a punishment 
might fail to satisfy the purpose of retribution. 
With respect to deterrence, the same arguments from Atkins would apply. 
Executing a mentally ill offender does not have any significant deterrent 
effect, both because similar offenders are not susceptible to deterrence and 
because the marginal effect of deterrence in this context does not justify an 
execution. 
Currently, states make such decisions, as mentioned, on a case-by-case 
basis. One could imagine, however, that certain mental illnesses exist such 
that the death penalty would never be appropriate.174 As such, the evolving 
standards of decency could remove the possibility of death in those cases 
through a categorical constitutional rule.  
2. Methods of Execution 
In recent years, a number of states have had increasing difficulty 
obtaining the drugs needed to conduct lethal injections.175 As a result, 
several states have explored using other methods of execution, including 
firing squads, hanging, and the electric chair.176 Under the evolving 
standards of decency, the use of such methods might be unconstitutional. 
As the implementation of a death sentence, the doctrine could apply to 
assess such practices.177 
In the Court’s two most recent methods of execution cases, Baze v. 
Rees178 and Glossip v. Gross,179 the Court’s analysis has focused on whether 
the risk of substantial pain makes the punishment cruel and unusual.180 In 
                                                 
174. The same difficulty demonstrated by Atkins, Hall, and Moore—determining which offenders 
fall in the proscribed category—could also be an issue depending on the condition in question. 
175. See Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1360–66 
(2014); Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 
1367, 1380 (2014). 
176. Note that the Court evaluates techniques under a pain-based standard. See Glossip v. Gross, 
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008); Berry & Ryan, Cruel Techniques, 
Unusual Secrets, supra note 56. (differentiating between type, method, and technique). 
177. It is not clear whether the evolving standards would apply to execution methods, but it is 
likely they would. The only methods cases in which the Court affirmed a particular method (as opposed 
to a technique) predated the adoption of the evolving standards. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. 
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (mechanical accident during first execution by electrocution did 
not make second cruel under the Eighth Amendment); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890) 
(electrocution is a permissible form of execution under the Eighth Amendment). 
178. 553 U.S. at 35. 
179. 135 S. Ct. at 2726. 
180. See Berry & Ryan, Cruel Techniques, Unusual Secrets, supra note 56 (discussing these 
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both those cases, however, the Court assessed a protocol involving the only 
form of capital punishment widely used—lethal injection.181 And the 
question before the Court in both cases focused on whether the kind of 
injection created a constitutional problem, not whether the concept of 
injecting an inmate with lethal drugs itself constituted a cruel and unusual 
punishment.182 
With respect to other methods, though, states have largely abandoned 
them based on a perception that they were draconian, and certainly more 
brutal than lethal injection.183 The question, then, would be whether the 
evolving standards of decency would foreclose such a reversal by states.184 
The Court has noted on more than one occasion that it has never struck down 
a method of execution as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.185 The 
states’ use of methods, though, has always moved in the direction of 
choosing (at least purportedly) more humane options.186  
As a matter of objective indicia, it seems clear states have, for the most 
part, not used methods other than lethal injection in recent years.187 With 
respect to state statutes, lethal injection remains the predominant method, 
with some states allowing other methods as alternatives.188 As for actual 
executions, 1301 out of 1476 executions since the reinstatement of the death 
penalty in 1976 have been by lethal injection.189 
Given the majoritarian undercurrent influencing the determination of 
evolving standards, the majority view with respect to methods could 
foreclose the adoption of new methods under the Eighth Amendment, 
despite a few states moving in that direction in recent years.190 
The subjective indicia could also, in theory, support a determination that 
the evolving standards of decency barred the use of firing squads,191 
                                                 
cases). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. See id. 
184. See Stinneford, supra note 27. 
185. Glossip v. Gross, 136 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 48 (2008). 
186. See Berry & Ryan, Cruel Techniques, Unusual Secrets, supra note 56. 
187. See Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/views-executions [https://perma.cc/AER9-CUJM].  
188. Methods of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/methods-
execution [https://perma.cc/B4SE-2DRU]. 
189. See Searchable Execution Database, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions?exec_name_1=&sex=All&sex_1=All&method[]=Lethal 
+Injection&federal=All&foreigner=All&juvenile=All&volunteer=All [https://perma.cc/8SB3-WMQ 
M].  
190. Tennessee recently amended its statute to allow for electrocution. Tennessee Governor Signs 
Forced Electrocution Bill, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5778 [https:// 
perma.cc/R57Q-X7XR]. 
191. Interestingly, lethal injection with midazolam may be a more severe punishment than death 
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hangings, and electrocutions. Retribution, for instance, does not require the 
use of a less humane method of execution, particularly when a more humane 
one exists. Similarly, there is no evidence that a hanging, firing squad, or an 
electrocution would have more deterrent value than a lethal injection.192 If 
anything, adoption of one or more of these methods might deter the use of 
the death penalty itself.193 With respect to incapacitation and rehabilitation, 
neither would justify the use of the older methods. As explored below, 
dangerousness and rehabilitation do not justify the death penalty itself, 
much less favor one method over another. 
C. Other Categories of Differentness 
In addition to the potential micro-level categorical exemptions explored 
above, the Court could also expand the evolving standards of decency 
doctrine by developing other categories of differentness besides the death 
penalty and juvenile offenders, consistent with shifting majoritarian views 
on particular kinds of offenders and offenses. Interestingly, of the two 
categories of differentness, one is a type of punishment (the death penalty) 
and one is a type of offender (juveniles). In theory, then, other categories of 
differentness—scenarios warranting the higher scrutiny of the evolving 
standards of decency approach under the Eighth Amendment—might 
involve either other categories of punishment or other categories of 
offenders. 
1. Other Possible Categories of “Different” Punishments 
The most obvious category for differentness among non-capital 
punishments is life without parole (LWOP). First, LWOP is its own kind of 
death sentence—a sentence to die in the custody of the state with no 
possibility for release. In addition, the Court already limits the use of LWOP 
in one context—juveniles.194  
As I have suggested in other papers, LWOP can serve as its own kind of 
different, warranting higher scrutiny than other punishments in certain 
contexts.195 Putting aside the question of a macro-exclusion, the lack of 
                                                 
by firing squad. See Mark Joseph Stern, Justice Sotomayor Takes Aim at Lethal Injection, SLATE (Feb. 
21, 2017, 1:48 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/02/justice_ 
sotomayor_takes_aim_at_lethal_injection_our_most_cruel_experiment.html. 
192. As explored below, there are serious questions as to whether capital punishment has any 
deterrent value at all. See Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, 
Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751 (2005). 
193. AUSTIN SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES (2014). 
194. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
195. William W. Berry III, The Mandate of Miller, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327 (2014) [hereinafter 
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careful legislative consideration with respect to LWOP suggests the need 
for categorical exclusions.196 Indeed, in many jurisdictions, LWOP 
sentences are simply the product of a state legislature’s decision to abolish 
parole, such that fifteen to twenty year sentences have become automatic 
death-in-prison sentences.197 Further, were the Court to even consider a 
categorical LWOP exclusion, states may be more likely to re-examine their 
use of LWOP.198 This has certainly been the case with mental retardation 
(the response to Penry) and juvenile death sentences (the response to 
Stanford). 
a. Mandatory LWOP 
Mandatory LWOP sentences provide one clear category for possible 
proscription under the evolving standards of decency.199 There is a basis 
already, in Woodson and Miller, for creating this kind of exclusion under 
the Court’s application of the Eighth Amendment. To be sure, the concerns 
of both Woodson and Miller apply to LWOP sentences.200  
With respect to Woodson, the Court made clear that offenders require 
individualized consideration of their crime and background prior to the 
imposition of death sentences.201 Lockett v. Ohio further expanded this idea, 
providing justification to use mitigation evidence at capital sentencing, 
including the opportunity for the offender to plead for mercy.202 
Miller likewise embraced these principles, but also reflected on LWOP 
as a punishment.203 It focused on the finality of such a determination and the 
need for a judicial determination in that such a sentence foreclosed the 
possibility of rehabilitation and return to society. LWOP as a sentence thus 
had such a significant effect that its application (at least to juvenile 
                                                 
Berry, The Mandate of Miller]; Berry, Eighth Amendment Differentness, supra note 167. 
196. William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions: A Constitutional Framework for 
Curbing Mass Incarceration, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 67 (2015) [hereinafter Berry, Eighth Amendment 
Presumptions]; William W. Berry III, Life-with-Hope Sentencing: The Argument for Replacing Life-
Without-Parole Sentences with Presumptive Life Sentences, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051 (2015) [hereinafter 
Berry, Life-with-Hope Sentencing]. 
197. Berry, Life-with-Hope Sentencing, supra note 196. 
198. Berry, Eighth Amendment Presumptions, supra note 196; Berry, Life-with-Hope Sentencing, 
supra note 196. 
199. Berry, The Mandate of Miller, supra note 195; Berry, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 
supra note 167. 
200. Berry, The Mandate of Miller, supra note 195; Berry, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 
supra note 167. 
201. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976); Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a 
Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263 (2005); Berry, Promulgating Proportionality, supra 
note 74, at 69.  
202. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
203. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Berry, The Mandate of Miller, supra note 195. 
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offenders) violated the evolving standards.204 
As to the application of objective indicia, the Court elected not to use 
state counts in Miller as the basis for its application of evolving standards. 
The lack of state statutes barring mandatory LWOP, then, might not 
foreclose its consideration under the evolving standards. 
To the extent that the Court looked to international standards, a stronger 
case for objective indicia would arise. The United States, as with JLWOP 
and the juvenile death penalty before Roper, remains an outlier with respect 
to its use of LWOP.205 The United States has over 40,000 offenders serving 
LWOP sentences, while the next three most populous LWOP countries—
the UK, the Netherlands, and Australia—account for less than 150 
offenders.206 Data concerning the number of mandatory LWOP sentences is 
not readily available, but the broader use of LWOP in the United States as 
compared to the rest of the world does bear on its relationship to the 
evolving standards. As with Roper, the Court’s finding of a majority here 
would rest on a broader framing of the popular will.  
Finally, it is important to note that in Miller, a clear precedent, the Court 
did not rely on objective indicia alone in its determination that mandatory 
JLWOP sentences were cruel and unusual. Rather, the substance of the 
individualized consideration principle provided an alternative basis for a 
categorical constitutional exclusion. 
With respect to subjective indicia, retribution may not justify LWOP 
when it is mandatory for several reasons. If retribution aims to measure the 
just deserts of the offender, imposing a mandatory sentence may preclude 
the Court from determining whether such a sentence achieves the purpose 
of retribution. Further, for many of the applications of mandatory LWOP, it 
is clear that not every case achieves the purpose of retribution, particularly 
in light of potential mitigating factors. 
The Court has previously approved a mandatory LWOP sentence in 
Harmelin, but could reverse course for a number of reasons.207 First, as 
demonstrated by the reversal of Penry by Atkins and Stanford by Roper, the 
evolving standards do, indeed, evolve.208 In addition, the Court in Harmelin 
did not accord a level of differentness to LWOP.209 Doing so would result 
                                                 
204. Berry, The Mandate of Miller, supra note 195, at 340. 
205. Berry, Life-with-Hope Sentencing, supra note 196. 
206. Id. at 1076; ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NO EXIT: THE 
EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA 7 (2009), http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/ 
resource_1393.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3HR-NDME]; Ashley Nellis, Throwing away the Key: The 
Expansion of Life Without Parole Sentences in the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27, 27 (2010). 
207. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). See Berry, Unusual Deference, supra note 34.  
208. See discussion supra Part II. Eighth Amendment Majoritarianism 
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in a more rigorous analysis of mandatory LWOP sentences.210 
With respect to the subjective indicia, many of the concerns expressed in 
Woodson and Miller (as discussed above) would apply. Likewise, in many 
cases, the difference between a seventeen-year old JLWOP offender and an 
eighteen-year old LWOP offender can be razor thin, even illusory, in some 
cases. The science that the Court embraced in Graham and Miller further 
suggests that offenders under the age of 25 should receive some mitigation 
based on age at sentencing, given the incomplete development of their 
brains. Indeed, mandatory LWOP sentences preclude consideration of such 
evidence, which in some cases may provide grounds for mitigation. 
b. Non-Homicide LWOP 
Another possible categorical exclusion with respect to LWOP would be 
for non-homicide crimes. Such an approach would follow the Court’s 
analysis in Kennedy and Graham. Given the recent national conversation 
concerning mass incarceration, the majority will might support such a 
limitation.211 
With respect to the objective indicia, state legislatures still allow non-
homicide LWOP, so the initial evaluation might be unsuccessful. A broader 
inquiry, however, looking at actual sentencing practices—the number of 
non-homicide LWOP sentences compared to overall LWOP sentences—
might provide some basis for moving toward a consensus. Also, as 
mentioned above, the outlier status of the United States with respect to 
LWOP might indicate an international consensus. In short, there must be 
more movement in this direction to form the basis for a consensus, given 
that the majoritarian approach still undergirds the application of evolving 
standards. 
With respect to the subjective indicia, however, there exists a much 
stronger case for advancing the evolving standards to proscribe such 
sentences. By their very nature, LWOP sentences in many, if not all cases, 
arguably are excessive punishments for non-homicide crimes.212 
Understanding LWOP sentences as a type of death sentence helps advance 
this conceptualization.  
As with other examples, there is little evidence that deterrence justifies a 
LWOP sentence where the offender commits a non-homicide crime. Rather, 
                                                 
supra note 34; Berry, The Mandate of Miller, supra note 195; Berry, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 
supra note 167. 
210. Berry, The Mandate of Miller, supra note 195. 
211. See generally MAUER, supra note 23; STEVENSON, supra note 23; ALEXANDER, supra note 
23; 13TH, supra note 23. 
212. Berry, Life-with-Hope Sentencing, supra note 196. 
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a life with parole sentence could, in most cases, achieve a similar deterrent 
effect on future offenders. 
Incapacitation likewise does not justify LWOP sentences for non-
homicide offenses, as the nature of the offense itself might cast doubt on the 
dangerousness of the offender. This becomes particularly true when one 
realizes that the justification must find that the offender will always be 
dangerous, requiring a death-in-prison sentence.  
Finally, as with the death penalty, LWOP sentences forego the possibility 
of rehabilitation. Offenders receiving LWOP will never rejoin society. 
Perhaps the normative disconnect between the purposes of punishment and 
non-homicide LWOP sentences will spur the Court to broadly frame the 
makeup of the political majority in this context. 
2. Other Possible Categories of “Different” Offenders 
Just as the differentness inherent in JLWOP could reflect a potential 
differentness in the punishment of LWOP, it could also reflect a kind of 
differentness in juvenile offenders.213 If juveniles are a different kind of 
offender, it raises the possibility that other kinds of offenders could be 
different. This subsection explores some possibilities and their potential 
implications. 
Given that one’s relative youth constitutes a basis for differentness, it 
might be equally possible that one’s old age might serve as a basis for 
differentness. Unlike youth, though, where brain science ascribes a 
characterization of diminished culpability for juvenile offenders, older 
offenders cannot claim a diminished culpability based on immaturity, lack 
of development, or naiveté. Rather, older offenders might be different in 
that the impact of a criminal sentence might be more severe than upon a 
young adult or middle-aged offender. This impact can occur in two senses.  
First, as a percentage of one’s remaining life, a sentence for an elderly 
offender can often be much higher than for a younger offender. Where this 
seems to matter most is where a term sentence on an elderly offender has 
the likely effect (even certainty in some cases) of becoming a life sentence. 
A ten-year sentence, for instance, for a seventy-year-old offender has a 
different impact in some ways than a ten-year sentence for a twenty-five-
year-old offender in that the older offender most likely loses the possibility 
of leaving custody before death, whereas the younger offender most likely 
does not. 
Particularly in cases involving less serious crimes, query whether age 
ought to provide a basis for mitigation for elderly offenders, or at the very 
                                                 
213. Berry, The Mandate of Miller, supra note 195; Berry, Eighth Amendment Differentness, 
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least, require an inquiry by the Court into this issue. Were advanced age to 
serve as a kind of differentness, for instance, the Court could extend its 
decisions in Woodson and Miller to mandatory sentences imposed on 
elderly offenders. 
In other words, where an elderly offender commits an offense such that 
the practical consequence would be to impose a LWOP sentence on account 
of the offender’s remaining life expectancy combined with the mandatory 
minimum sentence, the evolving standards of decency would require 
individualized sentencing consideration, barring such mandatory sentences. 
The effect would be the same as with Woodson and Miller, just applied to 
what amounts to a different kind of death sentence. 
Second, a lengthy sentence might have a disproportionate effect on 
elderly offenders in a physical sense, as confinement may strain such 
offenders in ways that it might not younger offenders. Likewise, health 
conditions (clearly more prevalent in elderly offenders) might also offer the 
basis for differentness. The practices of states with respect to mental, 
emotional, and physical health, then, might be relevant under the Eighth 
Amendment both as matters of sentence length and conditions of 
confinement. 
Both avenues of establishing elderly differentness—the impact of a 
sentence in light of proximity to death and the increased physical and 
emotional toll of incarceration on older offenders—could open the door to 
further constitutional analysis and protection against legislative punitive 
excesses. Under the evolving standards, however, such an approach is 
unlikely to gain traction until some jurisdictions elect to advance some set 
of safeguards for elderly offenders at sentencing. Once a basis for objective 
determinations of shifting evolving standards emerges, the basis for 
articulating a subjective basis would follow. 
The most promising approach appears to be barring mandatory sentences 
for elderly offenders that approach life expectancy. In Woodson and Miller, 
the Court focused less on jurisdiction counting in making its objective 
determination and more on the need for individualized sentencing 
determinations, as discussed above. The same idea would apply here, with 
a sentence exceeding one’s life expectancy receiving the same kind of 
scrutiny as discussed with mandatory LWOP in the previous section. 
The basic principle would be that where an offender faces a sentence that 
will probably result in him dying in prison, the imposition of that sentence 
should not be mandatory. Given the stakes—death in prison—one ought to 
have the Court give individualized consideration to that person’s criminal 
acts and character before making such a weighty determination. Similarly, 
the offender should have the opportunity, as described in Woodson and 
Lockett, to offer mitigating evidence at sentencing.  
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Further, none of the purposes of punishment require the imposition of 
the mandatory sentence. Imposing just deserts on an elderly offender can 
result just as easily from a judicial decision regarding the appropriate 
sentence as from a legislative decision concerning a mandatory sentence. 
Indeed, the judicial determination is much more likely to accord the 
offender his just deserts largely because the judge can make an 
individualized sentencing determination. It is possible that the removal of a 
mandatory consequence could lessen the deterrent value of such a sentence, 
but there is little evidence that the mandatory nature of a sentence creates a 
deterrent effect. Otherwise, the substantive sentencing outcome is likely to 
be similar in many cases. With respect to dangerousness, individualized 
determinations are likewise preferable because the judge can actually 
attempt to measure the individual’s character, instead of simply applying a 
pre-determined legislative sentencing formula. Similarly, removal of the 
mandatory nature of a sentence provides a much better opportunity to 
evaluate an offender’s capacity for rehabilitation than a mandatory sentence 
could. 
As with LWOP, one could imagine a similar analysis with respect to the 
imposition of lengthy sentences that approach the offender’s life expectancy 
in cases involving non-homicide crimes. As with LWOP, there does not yet 
appear to be a clear societal consensus for the expansion of the evolving 
standards in this direction. 
Other possible categories of “different” offenders might include (1) 
veterans, (2) mentally ill offenders, and (3) intellectually disabled offenders. 
To date, state legislatures have not developed significant categorical 
limitations to punishing these groups outside of the capital punishment 
context. Each group, though, has mitigating characteristics that could serve 
as the basis for evolving standards of decency exclusions. 
IV. EVOLVED STANDARDS (MACRO LEVEL) 
Perhaps the most important question with respect to the future 
application of the evolving standards of decency doctrine is whether the 
Court will make the leap from micro-level (creating limits to particular 
punishments) to macro-level (eliminating the punishments themselves) 
applications. Interestingly, the case for proscribing JLWOP and even the 
death penalty under the evolving standards of decency and the Eighth 
Amendment appears stronger than for any of the above-described potential 
micro-level exceptions. Before Part V makes the case for why the Court 
should move in this direction, this Part examines the merits of the arguments 
under the evolving standards of decency in light of the current status quo. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2018] EVOLVED STANDARDS, EVOLVING JUSTICES? 143 
 
 
 
A. JLWOP Abolition 
The question of application of the Eighth Amendment to the sentence of 
JLWOP under the evolving standards of decency begins with an assessment 
of the applicable objective indicia. To date, twenty states and the District of 
Columbia have banned JLWOP sentences.214 Another six states allow 
JLWOP sentences, but currently do not have anyone serving JLWOP 
sentences.215 Out of fifty-one jurisdictions, over half do not have an offender 
serving a JLWOP sentence or have banned JLWOP prospectively.216 
In addition, the prevailing trend is strongly away from JLWOP 
sentences. Since the Court decided Miller v. Alabama in 2012, fifteen states 
have abolished JLWOP sentences.217 The most significant of these may 
have been California, creating parole opportunities for one of the largest 
JLWOP populations in the United States.218 By one 2009 estimate, 
California had over 300 JLWOP offenders.219 After abolition in and 
California, two states— Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Michigan—account 
for two-thirds of the remaining JLWOP sentences.220 
In addition to the current legislative breakdown and clear trend toward 
abolition of JLWOP, the international consensus (which the Court looked 
to in Roper)221 is unanimously against JLWOP sentences.222 In fact, the 
United States is the only country in the world that allows the imposition of 
JLWOP sentences.223 
All of these objective facts make a strong case for a determination that 
the evolving standards of decency and the Eighth Amendment now ban 
                                                 
214. Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming have abolished JLWOP. Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An 
Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/ 
juvenile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/ESC8-8DYD] [hereinafter, Sentencing Project JLWOP 
Brief]. See also The Map, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE, https://juvenilelwop.org/map/ [https:// 
perma.cc/59WZ-EMKC] (last updated Nov. 20, 2017) [hereinafter, JLWOP Map]. 
215. Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island all fall in this 
category. Sentencing Project JLWOP Brief, supra note 214; JLWOP Map, supra note 214. 
216. Sentencing Project JLWOP Brief, supra note 214; JLWOP Map, supra note 214. 
217. The states are as follows: California (2017), Colorado (2016), Connecticut (2013), Delaware 
(2013), Hawaii (2014), Iowa (2016), Massachusetts (2013), Nevada (2015), New Jersey (2017), South 
Dakota (2016), Texas (2013), Utah (2016), Vermont (2015), West Virginia (2014), Wyoming (2013). 
See JLWOP Map, supra note 214. 
218. Sentencing Project JLWOP Brief, supra note 214. 
219. JLWOP Map, supra note 214. 
220. Sentencing Project JLWOP Brief, supra note 214. 
221. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (“Our determination that the death penalty is 
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United 
States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death 
penalty.”). 
222. See Knafo, supra note 22. 
223. See id.  
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JLWOP sentences. The objective evidence, while not as strong as Coker, 
certainly is comparable to, if not better than the evidence that the Court 
accepted in Atkins and Roper. The majoritarian approach certainly would 
embrace this expansion of the evolving standards of decency. 
With respect to the Court’s subjective judgment, the case for JLWOP 
abolition is equally strong. The Court’s prior cases, in establishing that 
juveniles are different, have emphasized the diminished level of culpability 
possessed by juvenile offenders. Assuming this diminished level of 
culpability, it does not seem a reach to determine that JLWOP sentences 
never satisfy the purpose of retribution because the just deserts of juvenile 
offenders does not ever warrant a death-in-custody sentence.  
With respect to deterrence, JLWOP sentences similarly fail. Presuming 
that juvenile offenders cannot fully appreciate the consequence of their 
actions, the likelihood of a JLWOP sentence having a strong deterrent effect 
becomes low.  
Similarly, JLWOP does not satisfy the purpose of dangerousness. First, 
by converting the sentence to life with parole, the offender does not 
necessarily leave state custody. A parole board will determine whether the 
offender is dangerous. Further, the age of the offender in JLWOP cases 
makes it likely at some point that the individual will no longer be a danger 
to society, at least in some cases. As such, JLWOP sentences do not satisfy 
the purpose of incapacitation.  
Finally, it is clear that JLWOP sentences do not satisfy the purpose of 
rehabilitation. Indeed, one of the strongest arguments against JLWOP 
sentences is the amount of time available for rehabilitation for juvenile 
offenders, a possibility a JLWOP sentence forecloses.  
Unlike the more controversial question of the death penalty (addressed 
below), JLWOP abolition ought to be less controversial because in many 
cases it will not change the sentencing outcome for the juvenile offender. 
Abandoning JLWOP does not mean juvenile offenders might not serve life 
sentences until their death.224 Rather, it simply gives an opportunity for a 
juvenile offender to rehabilitate himself and eventually rejoin society.225 
B. Death Penalty Abolition 
As with JLWOP, there is an increasingly substantial argument that the 
death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment, at least with respect to the 
evolving standards of decency test currently employed by the Supreme 
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225. For a more developed explanation of why LWOP sentences (and not just JLWOP sentences) 
should be abolished, see id.  
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Court. With respect to the objective indicia, a small majority of jurisdictions 
retain the death penalty, with thirty-one states permitting capital 
punishment.226 Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have abolished 
the death penalty.227 In addition, four states have current gubernatorial 
moratoria on the death penalty.228 That means that twenty-three out of fifty-
one jurisdictions currently ban the death penalty.229 
Further, the death penalty in a number of states constitutes a level of de 
facto abolition. Of the states that retain the death penalty, ten states—
Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Montana, Idaho, South Dakota, 
Oregon, Colorado, Wyoming, and Connecticut—have had fewer than five 
executions in the forty years since Gregg reinstated the death penalty in 
1976.230 If one adds the de facto states to the de jure states, thirty-three out 
of fifty-one states do not actively use the death penalty.231 
With respect to the death penalty, it is clear that its use is concentrated 
in a few states. Oklahoma, Virginia, and Texas account for over half of the 
executions in the past forty years.232 Only ten states—the three just 
mentioned plus Florida, Missouri, Georgia, Alabama, Ohio, Arkansas, and 
Arizona—currently execute offenders on an annual or bi-annual basis.233 
The number of executions has diminished from a high of ninety-eight in 
1999 to less than fifty per year over the past six years, including just twenty 
in 2016 and twenty-three in 2017.234 Even more drastic has been the steady 
decrease in the number of death sentences imposed annually, from 295 in 
1998 to just 39 in 2017.235 Clearly, juries are becoming less and less likely 
                                                 
226. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming still retain the death penalty as a punishment. States with 
and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/AZ36-MVQV]. 
227. Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin prohibit death sentences. Id. 
228. Oregon (2011), Colorado (2013), Washington (2014), and Pennsylvania (2015) all have 
moratoria. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/documents/FactSheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPF6-NY3F] (last updated May 17, 2018). 
231. Id. 
232. See Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., ht 
tp://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976 [https://perma.cc/XGE3-7L6 
D] (last updated Mar. 28, 2018). 
233. Id. Arkansas is a new addition to this group, as it executed four inmates in 2017, the first 
since 2005. Id. 
234. Id. 
235. Facts About the Death Penalty, supra note 232.  
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to impose death sentences, particularly with the availability of LWOP 
sentences.236 
The recent trend of states likewise supports a determination that the death 
penalty has become disfavored under the evolving standards of decency. In 
the past decade, eight states—New Jersey (2007), New York (2007), New 
Mexico (2009), Illinois (2011), Connecticut (2012), Maryland (2013), 
Nebraska (2015), and Delaware (2016)—have legislatively or judicially 
abolished the death penalty.237 Only Nebraska has reinstated it.238 
Several other data sources inform the majoritarian objective indicia with 
respect to the death penalty. While not used in prior cases, they provide 
additional context to the state counting approach. First, a recent report by 
the Fair Punishment Project at Harvard Law School demonstrates that the 
five “deadliest” prosecutors are responsible for 440 death sentences, or 
about 15% of the cases.239  
Similarly, geography has become highly correlated with the death 
penalty.240 Ten counties (all in Texas or Oklahoma except one) account for 
a quarter of all post-Furman executions. Further, less than 15% of counties 
in the United States (454 out of 3146) have had an execution in the past 
forty years.241 Even more telling, only thirty-six counties have executed four 
or more offenders in the past forty years—one percent of counties in the 
United States.242 If the Court were to assess the objective indicia on a county 
level rather than a state level, the overwhelming national consensus is 
against the death penalty, at least in terms of its actual usage. 
Internationally, there is evidence that the United States has increasingly 
become an outlier concerning its use of the death penalty, particularly with 
respect to Western nations.243 Virtually all of Europe has abolished the death 
                                                 
236. Note, A Matter of Life and Death: The Effect of Life-Without-Parole Statutes on Capital 
Punishment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1838 (2006). 
237. States with and Without the Death Penalty, supra note 226. Note that Nebraska voted to 
reinstate the death penalty by statewide referendum in November 2016. Nebraska, DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/nebraska-1 [https://perma.cc/Z82X-6P2J]. 
238. Nebraska, supra note 237. 
239. See FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, AMERICA’S TOP FIVE DEADLIEST PROSECUTORS: HOW 
OVERZEALOUS PERSONALITIES DRIVE THE DEATH PENALTY 18 (2016), http://fairpunishment.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/FPP-Top5Report_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZA6-CE5Y]. 
240. See Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. 
REV. 227, 227–46 (2012); Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for 
Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 308–11 (2010) (commenting 
that there is a geographic arbitrariness within death penalty states). 
241. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY 3 (2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/Baumgartner-geography-of-ca 
pital-punishment-oct-17-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZKZ-TUKA]. 
242. Id. at 5. 
243. See generally DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION (2010); HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 
16. 
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penalty, as have almost all of the countries in North and South America 
except for the United States.244 
Of the 140 nations in the world, more than two-thirds have abolished the 
death penalty or have ceased using it.245 In 2015, the United States was again 
one of the top five countries in terms of number of executions, along with 
China, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.246  
By all accounts, then, the volume of objective indicia creates the 
strongest case for death penalty abolition in the past four decades. If the 
current trajectory continues, the case will only become stronger as the 
number of new death sentences and executions both continue to decrease. 
For abolitionists, this becomes a question of properly reading the public will 
or otherwise risking a Furman-type backlash. 
With respect to the subjective indicia, the question becomes whether any 
of the purposes of punishment justify the use of capital punishment. 
Typically, the Court has considered retribution and deterrence as the two 
possible legitimate justifications for the death penalty. Retribution does not 
constitute a valid purpose for capital punishment, as there are other ways to 
achieve that purpose than by killing an offender.247 Indeed, the execution of 
an offender forecloses the possibility of rehabilitation. 
Incapacitation also does not provide an adequate ground for the death 
penalty. LWOP creates the ability to protect society from dangerous 
offenders. Dangerousness does not require executions. 
Deterrence likewise does not justify the use of capital punishment, 
largely because there is no evidence that the death penalty actually deters 
crime.248 At best, the results of social science studies concerning the 
deterrent value of the death penalty are inconclusive.249 The predominant 
view, based on a number of studies, remains that the death penalty does not 
                                                 
244. Death Penalty 2015: Facts and Figures, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.am 
nesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/04/death-penalty-2015-facts-and-figures/ [https://perma.cc/RH8C-DX 
DM] [hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L]. See also HOOD & HOYLE, supra note 16; Oliver Smith, Mapped: 
The 58 Countries that Still Have the Death Penalty, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www. 
telegraph.co.uk/travel/maps-and-graphics/countries-that-still-have-the-death-penalty/ (providing a map 
showing retentionist and abolitionist countries). 
245. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 245. 
246. Id. The number of executions in North Korea is not publicly available, so it could possibly 
be in this group as well. 
247. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring); Dan Markel, State, 
Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (2005). 
248. See Steiker, supra note 192, at 753; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184–86 (1976); John J. 
Donohue & Justin Wolfers, The Death Penalty: No Evidence for Deterrence, ECONOMISTS’ VOICE (Apr. 
2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/DonohueDeter.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B8H-LU34]. 
249. The Court has admitted as much in Gregg v. Georgia. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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deter crime.250 
Retribution, then, provides the only plausible justification for the use of 
capital punishment. Just deserts retribution, the dominant strain of the 
theory, rests on the principle that the offender will receive the punishment 
commensurate with his culpability and harm caused. It is not clear, though, 
that retribution ever requires the imposition of the death penalty. As 
explained by Andrew von Hirsch and others, just deserts as a theory can 
give an ordinal ranking to punishments but is unable to ascribe a cardinal 
value to particular crimes.251 In other words, just deserts retribution requires 
proportionality but cannot determine that the death penalty is a proportional 
punishment for any crime. 
Indeed, as discussed above, most of the world has concluded that the 
death penalty is an excessive punishment for all crimes. It would not be a 
stretch for the Court to conclude, in light of evolving standards of decency, 
that death is an excessive punishment for any crime and therefore retribution 
does not justify the death penalty.252 
Retribution might also not provide a justification for capital punishment 
in another sense. For some, the core of retribution lies in the communication 
of censure by the state to the criminal offender. What matters, then, is the 
ability of the state to adequately communicate its condemnation of the 
offender. The Court has focused on this aspect of retribution in Atkins v. 
Virginia and Panetti v. Quarterman, emphasizing the negative impact on 
the concept of retribution resulting where a mental impairment of the 
offender makes him unable to appreciate the reason for and the reality of his 
punishment.253 
The question remains whether an execution is necessary to adequately 
communicate the state’s condemnation in a particular case. A LWOP 
sentence, which is its own kind of death sentence, arguably can achieve the 
same communicative purpose as a death sentence. In the sentencing theory, 
there is not a clear connection between the censure itself and the volume of 
hard treatment required as part of the communication. The punishment 
simply has to be adequate to communicate the state’s condemnation. It is 
not clear that the death penalty is necessary to accomplish this goal. 
                                                 
250. Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 250. 
251. See Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment 16 CRIME & JUST. 
55 (1992); see, e.g., Paul Brady, Just Deserts: Can a Retributivist Theory of Punishment Be Justified?, 
12 IRISH STUDENT L. REV. 86, 113 (2004). 
252. For a more developed argument concerning why retribution does not justify capital 
punishment, see Markel, supra note 247.  
253. Perhaps the most heartbreaking example of this problem is the case of Ricky Ray Rector, the 
Arkansas inmate who decided to save his dessert for later at his final meal before his execution. See 
Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105. 
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In the final analysis, the Court has enough majoritarian objective 
evidence (at least compared to its earlier cases in Atkins and Roper) to find 
that the evolving standards of decency now consider the death penalty to be 
a cruel and unusual punishment. Moving the analysis down a level, from 
states to counties, makes the objective case simple and even more 
compelling. With respect to subjective indicia, the purpose of retribution 
provides the only intellectual hurdle, but certainly not an insurmountable 
one given the Court’s conjectural application of the purposes of punishment 
in other cases.254 
A final consideration with respect to advancing the evolving standards 
of decency to abolish JLWOP and the death penalty is the question of stare 
decisis. It is instructive to consider the degree to which the Court’s prior 
rulings limit its ability in this context. 
On their face, both questions—whether JLWOP and the death penalty 
violate the Eighth Amendment in light of the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society—are ones of first impression. 
The Court has considered the constitutionality of the death penalty in 
Furman and again in Gregg, but neither case analyzed the punishment under 
the current doctrine of evolving standards. In addition, those decisions are 
forty years old. 
The decisions upholding death sentences and JLWOP sentences, 
however, do provide some level of implicit approval of the punishments. 
Indeed, the Court has affirmed a significant number of each kind of 
sentence, creating a sense of precedent that such sentences are 
constitutional. 
The evolving standards of decency, however, do not rest on past 
precedent.255 Rather, they shift the meaning of the Eighth Amendment to 
make it consistent with societal standards—the standards that mark the 
progress of a maturing society. The expectation, then, remains that, over 
time, the Court will determine that certain punishments have now reached a 
threshold such that they have become unconstitutional because society’s 
progress now finds them to be indecent and excessive. 
Reversing prior determinations concerning whether a punishment is 
cruel and unusual has certainly happened before. Two cases are instructive.  
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court held that the execution of an intellectually 
                                                 
254. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 445–46 (2008) (where Justice Kennedy 
postulates that if states used the death penalty in child rape cases, then assailants would always kill their 
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255. See Meghan J. Ryan, Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amendment Death Penalty 
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disabled offender did not constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.256 
Thirteen years later, the Court reached the opposite conclusion in Atkins v. 
Virginia, holding that the evolving standards of decency proscribed the 
execution of intellectually disabled offenders.257 
Similarly, in Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court held that the execution of 
sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders did not constitute a cruel and 
unusual punishment.258 Sixteen years later, the Court reversed that decision 
in Roper v. Simmons, where the Court held that the evolving standards of 
decency and the Eighth Amendment proscribed the execution of juvenile 
offenders.259 
To find that JLWOP and the death penalty violate the evolving standards 
of decency and the Eighth Amendment would not require the Court to take 
the steps required in either Atkins or Roper with respect to stare decisis. 
Accordingly, stare decisis does not pose a serious impediment to the Court 
applying the evolving standards of decency in the manner proposed here. 
V. WHY THE JUSTICES SHOULD EVOLVE 
The Court’s history and jurisprudence provide a sound basis for 
expanding the Eighth Amendment to address the evolved standards 
explored above. To do so would not constitute judicial activism; to the 
contrary, the majoritarian underpinnings of the evolving standards of 
decency invite judicial review of cruel and unusual state punishment 
practices.  
A. Jurisprudential Consistency 
Certainly, a broadening of the Eighth Amendment would be consistent 
with the Court’s prior cases. Creating additional categorical exclusions as 
explored in Part III would simply extend the Court’s progress over the past 
decade in excluding outlier punishments. Requiring some majoritarian basis 
for each categorical exclusion would be consistent with the Court’s cases 
over the past two decades. 
In addition to the cases providing a basis for exclusions, Graham and 
Miller provide precedents for applying the Eighth Amendment to non-
capital cases, at least cases involving juvenile LWOP sentences. Further, 
the Court’s early Eighth Amendment cases, Weems v. United States260 and 
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Trop v. Dulles,261 both provide examples of Eighth Amendment applications 
to non-capital cases. 
Further, Trop provides a basis for instituting a macro-level exclusion, as 
does Furman. It is not outside the scope of the Court’s past cases to decide 
to abolish a particular punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
In short, the Court has previously made decisions similar to the ones 
proposed above in Parts III and IV. The question is whether a majoritarian 
consensus exists for additional micro or macro exclusions, and if so, 
whether the Court is willing to follow its past precedents. This is particularly 
true with respect to JLWOP and the death penalty. 
B. Eighth Amendment Normative Values 
Even if the Court abandoned its majoritarian approach, it has developed 
a set of Eighth Amendment values that guide its analysis in determining 
whether a particular punishment practice is cruel and unusual. Two concepts 
emerge from Weems and Trop that are instructive.  
Weems made clear, and Trop reaffirmed, that a core Eighth Amendment 
value is the “dignity of man.”262 This means that punishments that involve 
torture or otherwise dehumanize offenders violate the Eighth Amendment.  
A corollary concept related to dignity is proportionality. Proportionality 
prohibits the imposition of excessive punishments, and the Court’s cases 
provide a framework for applying this principle using the purposes of 
punishment. 
Together, these two ideas constitute a basis for assessing state 
punishment practices beyond the simple majoritarian analysis. To be sure, 
when punishments—whether micro or macro—transgress these core values 
and a majority of jurisdictions elects not to utilize them, the Court should 
examine carefully whether the practice violates the Eighth Amendment. As 
discussed, there is no need for the Court to hesitate when applying the 
Eighth Amendment.  
C. Evolving Justices? 
Given the many ways in which the societal standards of decency have 
evolved, then, the question becomes whether and when the justices on the 
Supreme Court will evolve in such a way as to begin to apply the Eighth 
Amendment to remedy the gap between constitutional doctrine and 
unconstitutional punishments.  
The current composition of justices on the Supreme Court makes further 
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inroads possible. The five-justice majority from Graham and Miller—
Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan—is still on the Court, 
and could opt to pursue any of the approaches in Parts III and IV if so 
inclined, particularly in light of the frequency such cases are appealed to the 
Supreme Court. 
This group of justices certainly seems committed to the principle that 
juvenile offenders merit heightened Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Similarly, 
these five justices seem serious about enforcing the holding in Atkins that 
proscribes the execution of intellectually disabled defendants. 
Finally, two justices—Ginsburg and Breyer—seem serious about re-
examining the constitutionality of the death penalty. Breyer’s dissenting 
opinion in Glossip v. Gross, which Ginsburg joined, chronicled all the 
shortcomings of the death penalty, and argued that the Court should revisit 
whether its use complies with the Eighth Amendment.263 
In light of the mass incarceration epidemic in the United States and the 
degree to which many criminal justice practices in America raise human 
rights questions, it is certainly possible that the Court might choose to 
intervene in one or more of the circumstances outlined in Parts III and IV. 
As this Article has established, counter-majoritarian concerns should not be 
an obstacle to advancing the Eighth Amendment doctrine. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has demonstrated the fallacy that the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty provides a reason for the Court not to apply the Eighth 
Amendment to state punishment practices. To the contrary, the Court’s 
doctrine shields it from any criticism with respect to counter-majoritarian 
detractors precisely because it incorporates majoritarian determinations into 
its analysis. 
Having shown that the Court is free to apply the doctrine, the Article has 
then explored a number of micro and macro applications of the Eighth 
Amendment. Interestingly, the strongest majoritarian consensus exists for 
the punishments themselves, with the macro applications becoming 
disfavored for both juvenile LWOP and the death penalty. One wonders 
whether the justices will evolve to catch up with these evolved standards. 
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